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The present article examines the political environment in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide from the perspective of diaspora members. Research
was conducted via in-person and telephone interviews from May 2015 to
March 2016 with eight members of the Rwandan diaspora in the United
States and Canada. The primary research objective questioned how members of this particular diaspora attempt to achieve justice and reconciliation
among one another. However, current Rwandan politics became a central
discussion point during interviews, particularly the residual effect among
the diaspora. Interviews suggest that the current political climate in Rwanda may have created a culture of silence among diaspora members. Members of the diaspora appear to be hesitant to discuss potentially political and
divisive topics for fear of retaliation against themselves, their family, and
loved ones remaining in Rwanda. Furthermore, interviews suggest that
participants believe that the Rwandan government is monitoring the diaspora. This, along with the promotion of a dominant narrative regarding the
1994 genocide, has created a residual political climate in the diaspora that
hinders attempts at justice and reconciliation among members.
Keywords: Rwandan diaspora, justice, reconciliation, Rwandan politics,
culture of silence
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Introduction
From April 1994 to July 1994, approximately 800,000 to 1 million Rwandans were murdered during a 90-day genocide between
the two predominant ethnic groups in the country, the Hutu and
the Tutsi (Gourevitch, 1998). The atrocity was largely the result of
hundreds of years of building ethnic tension exacerbated during
colonialism and fueled by the militant and anti-Tutsi-led government, both of which were also responsible for the 1959 genocide
that resulted in the death of over 20,000 Tutsi (Harrell, 2003). The
1994 genocide eliminated approximately 10–15% of the total Rwanda population (7 million), including 70% of the Tutsi population—
the overt targets of the genocide. The 1994 genocide ended when
the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF), under the command of Paul Kagame, seized political control of the country in July 1994. Kagame
is currently serving his third term as president of Rwanda. Upon
assuming power, the RPF became responsible for addressing justice
and reconciliation in a post-genocide society. Ultimately, the RPF
responded punitively to the 100,000 people accused of genocide.
This article examines the thoughts and feelings of those who left
Rwanda directly before, during, or shortly after the genocide. Data
are sourced from telephone interviews with diaspora members from
May 2015 through March 2016. Using phenomenological methodology, we observe how diaspora members’ feelings regarding the
genocide, justice, and reconciliation are closely related to their perception of the current political climate within Rwanda. The majority
of our findings challenge the carefully crafted image propagated by
the Kagame administration regarding its role in bringing justice and
peace to the people of Rwanda in a post-genocide society. In general, qualitative data indicate that diaspora members are doubtful of
the extent to which justice and reconciliation have been achieved.
More specifically however, interviewees attach their perspectives on
post-genocide justice and reconciliation to their impression of the
current political climate—a climate they overwhelmingly characterize as punitive and oppressive. Many remain fearful. According to
the diaspora members interviewed for this study, the current political climate in Rwanda precludes justice and reconciliation through
three mechanisms: the creation of a culture of silence; the creation of
fear through monitoring; and the enforcement of a single narrative
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of the genocide. Before going into further detail on these findings,
however, it is necessary to first examine social relations in Rwanda
in the years following the genocide as they pertain to justice, ethnic
relations, and the political climate.

Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda
Following the genocide, two institutionally-sanctioned structures were created to address issues of justice and reconciliation for
survivors: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
and gacaca (meaning grass) courts held locally throughout Rwanda
(Harrell, 2003). Gacaca courts were originally utilized in pre-colonial Rwanda as a way for communities to address crimes against its
members (Lahiri, 2009). Following the 1994 genocide, these courts
re-emerged in an attempt to address local issues in a society bereft
of a functioning judicial system. Participation in gacaca was mandated by the new Rwandan government, which categorized genocidal crimes along four levels (Harrell, 2003). Level 1 crimes included genocidal organizers, planners, those suspected of killing “with
a particular zeal and cruelty” (Hola & Nyseth Brehm, 2016, p. 62),
and those suspected of sexual crimes. Those who participated in
killings were tried for Level 2 crimes, while Level 3 crimes involved
all other acts of physical violence. Level 4 crimes referred to property crimes. Sentences for Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 crimes were death, life
in prison, incarceration according to Rwanda’s Penal Code, and reparations, respectively. If accepted by the court, individuals convicted of Level 2 and 3 crimes could reduce their sentence in exchange
for a guilty plea (Hola & Nyseth Brehm, 2016).
While very few Rwandans participated in the ICTR, around
250,000 Rwandans participated in gacaca courts in various capacities (Hola & Nyseth Brehm, 2016). By the end of the appellate hearings in 2012, around 2 million people were tried in gacaca courts.
Both the number of cases tried by gacaca courts and the number
of Rwandans involved in the process are pointed to as proof that
justice and reconciliation have been achieved for survivors—both
victims and offenders (Haider, 2014). Importantly, however, victimhood (in the eyes of the Rwandan government) has more to do with
one’s ethnic identity than their experience with violence during
and after the 1994 genocide.
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Post-Genocide Ethnic Relations
Following the genocide, the RPF government (led by President
Paul Kagame) instituted drastic measures to eliminate any and all
notions of ethnicity, tribalism, and race ideology from public discourse (Rafti, 2004). Based upon the presupposed notion that any
discussion of ethnicity is divisive, it is illegal to even mention ethnicity and ethnic difference. Simply put, Rwanda has entered into
a state of what Vandeginste refers to as “ethnic amnesia” (Vandeginste, 2014). These measures stand in stark contrast to pre-genocide Rwanda, wherein identity cards which stated one’s ethnic affiliation (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa) were assigned to each citizen (McLean
Hilker, 2012). Because this practice assisted in the easy identification of Tutsi during the genocide, the practice has been abolished.
The use of terms such as Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are only allowed in
public discourse when they are being used to “dismiss them and
deny their salience” (Hintjens, 2008, p. 12). And yet, the practice of
labeling Rwandans continues—it simply manifests along the lines
of victim and perpetrator rather than Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. These
lines are binary, strident, and unmoving in the eyes of the law, such
that all Hutu are supposed perpetrators and all Tutsi are victims
(Goehrung, 2017).
President Kagame’s administration has played an important
role in perpetuating the notion that all Hutus were necessarily perpetrators (Goehrung, 2017; Newbury & Newbury, 1999). Under Law
No. 47/2001 and Law No. 18/2008, the RPF codified their version
of the 1994 genocide, deeming it the only credible narrative of the
genocide. Under these laws, the Rwandan government is able to
criminally sanction anyone who proffers a narrative which contradicts theirs. Again, there is little, if any, variance in who can be
considered a victim or a perpetrator. This narrative of the genocide
directly contradicts existing research which suggests as many as
300,000 Hutu were killed during the genocide either because they
attempted to protect Tutsi, or as a result of their “moderate” Hutu
status (Goehrung, 2017). Moreover, this narrative severely impacts
Hutu survivors and their family. The consequences of this binary
narrative are articulated by Goehrung (2017):
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[I]n 1998 the Survivors of Genocide Fund (FARG) was established
to pay the school fees and grant assistance to orphans of the civil war. However, the fund lends support only to Tutsi children
even in areas where violence did not occur, while children who
are Hutu, including orphans whose parents were killed by other Hutu during the genocide for being Tutsi sympathizers, are
denied assistance because they are not considered legitimate
victims. The very recognition of Hutu as legitimate victims of
violence is in fact criminalized by Rwandan law. (p. 83)

Actions such as these lead Rwandans living at home and abroad to
question the extent to which justice and reconciliation have been
achieved, ultimately contributing to an increasingly hostile political climate (Kuradusenge-McLeod, 2018).

Post-Genocide Political Climate
The relationship between ethnic relations, victim-perpetrator
status, and political climate in Rwanda are closely intertwined. The
current political landscape in Rwanda suggests an almost total authoritarian regime spearheaded by President Kagame and the RPF.
The regime is perhaps most effective due to their intense level of
monitoring regarding the activities of its citizens, journalists (both
national and international), academics, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Amnesty International, 2010).
As was stated earlier, the Tutsi-led RPF took control of the
Rwandan government in 1994, an action that ultimately led to the
official conclusion of the genocide. It is important to note, however,
that upon assuming control of the government, the RPF (aided by
supportive civilians) immediately began targeting individuals they
believed to be Hutu militants, political opponents, and civilians.
Both Amnesty International and Africa Watch reported extensive
war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Hutu people
in the months following the genocide (Reyntjens, 2011). This narrative of the genocide, however, is not sanctioned by Rwandan law,
making it difficult for Hutu victims of violence to obtain justice. On
the other hand, by excluding these facts from the official narrative,
Kagame and the RPF are able to maintain their image as the heroes who swept in and put an end to the senseless violence (Kuradusenge-McLeod, 2018).
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Once order had been restored in Rwanda in the years following
the genocide, the Kagame regime began to aggressively crack down
on free speech. One year after the genocide, almost 40 NGOs were
ejected, with 18 more getting “suspended,” largely as a result of
their vocal concern over alleged human rights violations. Additionally, an April 2001 law gave the Rwandan government the ability
to control the finances and management of both local and international non-governmental agencies. In June 2004, the Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry on Genocide Ideology recommended banning all organizations that they believed produced speech that was
considered divisive or that promoted genocide ideology (Amnesty
International, 2010).
NGOs are not alone in being targeted by the RPF for speaking
out. Journalists and news reporters have also been identified as a
threat to the current regime and have been accused of reporting
inaccurate information and disseminating material that incites divisiveness. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have
consistently published reports regarding the lack of political transparency and human rights violations in Rwanda, and in turn have
been consistently accused by the government of producing inaccurate documents (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In August of 2008, the
Rwandan government accused both Voice of America (VOA) and
the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) of attempting to destroy
the unity of Rwandans. In early 2009, the government banned the
Kinyarwanda edition of the BBC for two months, and both BBC and
VOA were again threatened with sanctions later on that same year
(Reyntjens, 2011).
In addition to the attempts to silence journalists and discredit
research organizations, the Rwandan government has put in place
a variety of measures to limit the freedom of political expression
within Rwanda. Organic Law 2003 prohibits the political parties
from any discussion or production of information that can be
considered divisive. The main opposition party, Le Mouvement
Democratique Republicaine (LMDR) was outlawed in 2003. With
the exception of LMDR, other political parties in opposition to the
current administration are technically allowed; however, many political opponents have been placed on house arrest for accusations
of divisiveness, while others have been strategically exiled and imprisoned (Beswick, 2010).
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If this were not enough to cause concern, Kagame has successfully maintained an international image of having the overwhelming support of the people, in spite of highly doubtful election results. President Kagame won the presidential re-election in 2003 by
an overwhelming 95% of votes. In the 2008 and 2010 elections, the
RPF received over 98% of the general vote. However, it appears the
RPF-led government understood the difficulty of portraying this
astronomical number as a result of a democratic election, and they
reduced the number to 78% during the announcement of the official
election results (Reyntjens, 2011). In August of 2010, 93% voted for
President Kagame (Amnesty International, 2010). Reyntjens (2011)
suggested, “Rwandans know well what is expected of them” (p.
12). Although Article 101 of the Rwandan constitution states that
presidents may only hold office for two 7-year terms, Kagame successfully ran for a third term in 2017. During July 2015, both houses of Parliament voted in favor of altering the constitution so that
Kagame could remain a presidential candidate. After conducting
consultations with citizens in all 416 sectors of Rwanda, the government claimed only 10 Rwandans opposed the constitutional
amendment (News 24, 2015). Shortly after this report was submitted
to Parliament in August 2015, a constitutional amendment was approved. These topics—problems with the officially sanctioned narrative of the genocide, limitations on political dissent and freedom
of expression, and the power of Kagame and the RPF—emerged in
conversations with members of the Rwandan diaspora, individuals
who, despite their distance, keep a close eye on what has been unfolding in Rwanda since Kagame assumed power.

The Rwandan Diaspora and Residual Effects
Both during and following the genocide, a large number of Rwandans fled the country, establishing numerous diaspora throughout
the world, including in North America. According to the United
Nations Office High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2014 there were
approximately 5,600–7,700 Rwandans living in Canada and around
7,000 living in the United States, making the Rwandan diaspora in
North America modest, yet still substantial in size. According to extant literature, issues of ethnicity and politics within Rwanda often
have a residual effect on issues of ethnicity and politics experienced
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by the diaspora outside of Rwanda (Haider, 2014). Because of the
close connection to home and the level of nationalism, many members of the Rwanda diaspora believe that what occurs in Rwanda
has a residual effect, including fears (whether imagined or real) associated with speaking out about the government. Members of the
diaspora are well aware of what is going on in Rwanda regarding
the elimination of political opposition and independent media, and
this awareness does, in fact, affect them.
Anjan Sundaram (2016), for instance, demonstrates how the
Rwandan government conducts surveillance on members of the diaspora in his book Bad News: Last Journalists in a Dictatorship. Sundaram reports on Moses, a Rwandan journalist, who was pursued by
the government for his “critical reporting”:
He was to be deployed against his family, some of whom had fled
the country and were intellectuals in the Rwandan communities in Europe and America. His task would be to befriend these
aunts, uncles, cousins and nephews, and report on them to the
governmental services. It was possible that the authorities had
caught on to his activities at our program. Sending dissidents for
work abroad was a way to neutralize them. The same had happened to General Kayumba, who had been made the ambassador
to India. But here they were inflicting a double punishment on
Moses by asking him to turn on those who trusted him. (p. 121)

Indeed, diaspora members are impacted by post-genocide relations
in Rwanda to the extent that many have family remaining in the
country. Additionally, however, diaspora members are further impacted by post-genocide relations in Rwanda because the Rwandan government takes extreme care to maintain a watchful eye on
those who have left, typically in the form of perceived or actual
monitoring. Marijnen (2015) demonstrates how the presence of the
Rwandan government in Brussels negatively affects diaspora members living there. While Marijnen (2015ola) suggests that those in
the diaspora have more freedom to speak, she argues that speaking
out can come with very real consequences, including:
A trigger response from the RPF, usually in the form of the local
embassy or prominent exiles loyal to the regime. Hence, contentious Rwandan politics most often occurs beyond the territorial
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boundaries of Rwanda itself, especially on-line and in the social
media. (pp. 287–288)

According to Marijen, the Rwandan government does not see the
diaspora as an independent body that exists separate from Rwanda,
but rather sees it as an extremity of Rwanda that poses an “existential threat to its hegemonic project” (p. 292). To this end, Turner
(2013) suggests that the Rwandan diaspora is separated into three
categories by the state: members who support the works of the Kagame administration, those who remain skeptical and may be converted, and those who remain hostile toward the government and
are not capable of “rehabilitation.”
However, Marijnen (2015) outlines a more specific categorization
of the diaspora by the state as dictated by the Rwandan Diaspora
Policy. The first group includes those who fled Rwanda between
1959 and 1994 due to violence and hostility. This group is subdivided into two groups, which are designated both positive and negative. The “negative” group includes those who left Rwandan during
1959–1994 and are considered “subversive” due to spreading genocidal ideology or encouraging diaspora members to be critical of
the Rwandan government. The “positive” group includes descendants of refugees who fled Rwanda in 1959 and are frequently cited
as “victims.” They are defined by the Diaspora Policy as offspring
of those who left Rwanda for economical or other educational purposes—essentially, those that constitute the “brain drain” of Rwanda (Nmaemeka, 2007). Members of this group are highly sought
after by the Rwandan government, as they are seen as being well
positioned to contribute financially toward the rebuilding of the
country. The third and final group defined by the Diaspora Policy
includes descendants of refugees and Rwandans that are born to
foreigners. Marijnen (2015) notes that the Rwandan Diaspora Policy
publicly acknowledges that there is a lack of unity and community
cohesion among members of the diaspora, but she attributes this to
false information and the spreading of genocide ideology.
Marijnen (2015) further highlights that the lack of social cohesion among the diaspora as partially the result of ethnic boundaries.
However, she suggests that the current dominant public boundary
within the diaspora is political. They divide themselves often into
“pro-Kagame,” “anti-Kagame,” and “those that do not care” sets of

The Rwandan Diaspora

31

groups (p. 297). Not surprisingly, ethnic and political boundaries
tend to be blurred. Marijnen found that while individuals among
the diaspora may work and live near those of different Rwandan
ethnicities, there still existed a deep level of mistrust, running congruently along ethnic and political lines. While they may coexist
peacefully, they are not ready to create meaningful relationships
among one another.
Indeed, preliminary research shows that members of the
Rwandan diaspora do not feel justice and reconciliation have been
achieved either for them or for those remaining in Rwanda, that
reconciliation is typically superficial at best, with very few meaningful relationships created among different ethnicities, and that as
these issues continue to exist among those in Rwanda, they have a
residual effect on those in the diaspora. More specifically, if justice
and reconciliation have not occurred in Rwanda, diaspora members
seem to believe that justice and reconciliation have not occurred for
them (Marson, 2016).

Methods
As we aim to describe the lived experience and perceptions of
members of the Rwandan diaspora, phenomenology served as our
methodological and conceptual guide. In short, phenomenology
seeks to analyze the subjective experience as it is understood, perceived, and judged by the subject of inquiry (Sokolowski, 2000). As a
result, phenomenological studies are not concerned with representativeness of the sample; rather, they are concerned with providing
rich, analytic description of individuals’ perception of reality. The
phenomenological approach was necessary in this study because
the original research questions aimed to understand: (1) how members of the diaspora attempt to facilitate justice and reconciliation
among one another; and (2) diaspora members’ perception of what
justice and reconciliation look and feel like. Put simply, we were
not interested in determining if diaspora members had reached
a consensus on whether justice and reconciliation had or had
not occurred. What we found important was the extent to which
individual diaspora members felt that justice and reconciliation had
been achieved among one another. Phenomenology created space
for acknowledging differing opinions on the nature of justice and
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reconciliation--concepts which are rather abstract and are shaped
by one’s subjective experience.
To provide rich and analytic descriptions of individuals’ perception of reality, researchers who utilize phenomenology often
interview participants multiple times, gathering large amounts of
data on a single individual (Morse, 2000). For this reason, phenomenological studies often work with smaller sample sizes in comparison to other qualitative projects (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). In total,
eight members of the Rwandan diaspora were interviewed for this
study. Six of the eight participants were interviewed twice, resulting in 20–25 hours of interviewing. Morse recommends anywhere
from six to ten participants for projects utilizing phenomenology
(Morse, 2000).
Telephone and face-to-face interviews were conducted with
eight members of the Rwandan diaspora in a variety of locations in
the United States and Canada between May 2015 and March 2016.
Participants were identified via snowball sampling and interviews
were semi-structured in nature. Three participants identified as female and five as male. Seven participants were Tutsi and one was
Hutu. Three participants were citizens or permanent residents of
Canada and five were citizens/residents of the United States. Participants varied in age from 32 years to 60 years. It is important to
note that four of the eight participants worked for the Rwandan
government and/or judiciary prior to their relocation. Within the
qualitative framework, the life-story method of interviewing was
utilized for both in-person and telephone interviews.
Interview questions were aimed at understanding interviewees’ perceptions of the gacaca system and whether they felt justice
and reconciliation had been achieved (both in the diaspora and in
Rwanda). More specifically, the semi-structured interviews asked
questions about participants’ lives in Rwanda and their experiences
during the genocide. Participants were also asked about their perception of ethnic relations in Rwanda (before, during, and after the
1994 genocide). While the original research questions were focused
on understanding participants’ perceptions of the efficacy of gacaca
courts, their feelings about gacaca were secondary to their concerns
about the present-day political climate in Rwanda. As a result, transcripts were coded for discussions of justice, reconciliation, and
gacaca, as well as President Kagame, the Rwandan government,
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monitoring by the Rwandan government, and the “culture of silence” identified by participants.
Phenomenological methodologies allowed us to pursue unexpected themes that emerged from interviews with diaspora members. Thus, although justice and reconciliation were the primary
focus of the study, when political climate and the culture of silence
emerged in conversations with interviewees, the primary focus of
the study shifted to reflect their subjective experiences. The interviews revealed a sincere belief that speaking out negatively against
Kagame can have very real consequences for Rwandans, both those
in Rwanda and those abroad. Absolute proof of this type of monitoring is unattainable. However, what is important in this study is
that participants believe this to be real.

Findings
Findings consist heavily of direct quotations from participants,
as we were best able to preserve the authenticity of the participants’
standpoints and perspectives by using their exact words. Discussion of these topics was often complex and layered with additional
commentary. Each participant was provided a pseudonym to assure anonymity.
When this research began, we expected that interviews would
center exclusively on discussions of justice and reconciliation. However, participants were unable to truly discuss justice and reconciliation without addressing the two issues that appear to impede the
process of both: Rwandan politics and how such politics have created residual ethnic contention. Previous research supports the claim
that issues of ethnicity and politics within Rwanda often have a
residual effect on issues of ethnicity and politics experienced by the
diaspora outside of Rwanda (Haider, 2014; Mohamoud, 2005; Owen,
2009). As such, interviews focused heavily on the particular issue
of Rwandan politics and its effect on the diaspora. Three prominent
themes emerged: the political culture of silence; how the diaspora
is silenced through monitoring; and the single narrative of victimhood perpetuated following the genocide.
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Culture of Silence
All eight participants agreed that the Rwandan government is
an authoritarian government, where freedom of speech was stifled.
Participants varied in the degrees of this belief, as well as in their
opinions about the utility of it. For example, while most respondents felt that President Kagame and the administration were authoritarian, Jean-Paul and Therese offered a justification as to why
this approach, to some extent, is understandable following a mass
atrocity. Jean-Paul explained:
After the genocide, the way Kagame leads made sense in my
mind. I understand him releasing hundreds of perpetrators and
killing his opponents. I could understand him putting limits on
the freedom of expression because the experience was very recent. It made sense to limit the freedom of expression, but now
we are two decades after the genocide. Now is the time to build
something that is sustainable and what is sustainable is social
creation of strong institutions. True reconciliation, true history
about what happened in Rwanda. Human rights is a vicious cycle. You kill me or you chase me out because I criticize you. Kagame is killing people because some are criticizing him.

For Jean-Paul, this approach can be justified in the early years following the genocide. At this point, however, he sees it as not “sustainable” and worries it is creating a “vicious cycle.”
Like Jean-Paul, Therese justified the authoritarian actions of the
government. Therese was 9 years old during the genocide. Her parents and siblings were killed shortly after the genocide began. Shortly after, in 1996, she was granted asylum and moved to the United
States, yet she has some family who remain in Rwanda. Whereas
Jean-Paul cannot excuse the continued actions of the RPF-led government so many years after the genocide, Therese appeared to be
more understanding:
People even going to the same park or the same church saying
“hi”, that is a miracle. I think part of that is a result of having
that strong government that doesn’t allow certain things to take
place, so I do think that from the beginning there was a need for
a strong government and a leadership that was trying to curve
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everyone’s hostile feelings. People feel that some of that strong
type of leadership needs to relax and people need to start talking
about their grievances. Some of the criticism I do agree with, honestly. But sometimes I feel like they do not take in the context
and the reality on the ground. They say the government is not
democratic and certainly there is a need for more political space.
But it is something that needs to be managed and it needs to take
place slowly in the right space because it is something people are
just not ready for.

Therese worries that without the “strong type of leadership” that
currently exists, it would be impossible to “curve everyone’s hostile
feelings.”
Pierre is another participant who feels that a certain degree of
monitoring and control is necessary. Pierre was 39 years of age when
the genocide occurred. He and his wife survived, but his parents
and in-laws did not. He worked as a minister and a teacher in Kigali
until he relocated to the United States in 2003. Of all participants,
Pierre was the most supportive of President Kagame and the tactics
utilized by the government. Pierre agreed that there was extensive
control by the government, but justified such actions, as he felt Rwandans were “difficult” to govern. Pierre explained much of President
Kagame’s governing style as a result of his life experiences:
If we had a president with a civilian background, he would take
things differently but beginning where he (Kagame) begun, his
background makes him who he is. The military wants their subject to do according to what the officers say so that is the type of
leadership that is evolving there. A lot of it is positive; at least on
the whole there has been security. However, at one point people
fear that there is too much policing [laughs]. So you don’t know.

Even with justifications from participants such as Jean-Paul, Pierre,
and Therese, all respondents spoke of the culture of silence among
those in Rwanda and how Rwandans tend to be hesitant to speak
out publicly about any potentially divisive topics. This may be
attributed to the non-political cultural norm in Rwanda that discourages citizens from speaking about sensitive or political topics,
something participants referred to throughout our conversations
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with them. However, interviews suggest that the cultural norm is
highly exacerbated by the current administration.
In addition, participants typically spoke of Rwandan politics
and what is happening in Rwanda first, and then spoke of how
such issues affect and exist among the diaspora. Participants, to
varying degrees, discussed the authoritarian nature of the current
Rwandan government (most notably, President Kagame). Participants suggested that this authoritarian government had fostered
a culture of silence among those in Rwanda and residually among
the diaspora. In other words, participants suggested that the majority of Rwandans, both in Rwanda and the diaspora, are afraid to
speak honestly and publicly about anything political and politically
divisive (re: justice and reconciliation), for fear that the Rwandan
government may harm them or their families. This culture of silence also included discussion of monitoring among the diaspora,
as well as a single narrative that exists both in Rwanda and among
the diaspora.
Paul, a once prominent legal figure in Rwanda, was the first
participant interviewed for this study. He clearly discussed the negative perceptions of the current Rwandan administration among
the diaspora. When discussing what life may be like in Rwanda
currently, he stated:
The problem is not among Hutu and Tutsi. The problem is under
the dictatorship that is there. The Hutu and Tutsi are suffering
together. President Kagame’s problem is that he likes to maintain
his power.

Paul suggested that the ultimate goal of the Kagame administration was not to provide justice for Rwandans, but to exert political
power by ensuring citizens are afraid to speak. As indicated in the
quotation above, Paul believed that this affects both Hutu and Tutsi negatively. While Paul acknowledged problems with ethnicity,
he felt that the real problem lies in the Rwandan government, not
among the continued (yet informal) separation by ethnicity.
Another participant, Marc, worked closely with President Kagame for six years and ultimately left Rwanda because he became
vocal against the government and their policies. Because of his outspokenness, Marc feared for his life and fled first to South Africa
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and then to Canada. When discussing fear and silence in Rwanda
and the current administration, he stated:
One of the things with this regime is that it is very hard-core. The
(government) threatens, it is very careful about spreading fear.
There is a reason why it is successful—part of it explains why
there was genocide. It was genocide of neighbour against neighbour—the character of Rwandan people is that you obey. So when
you are ordered, you do and you do not question.

Jean-Paul, a former attorney in Rwanda who worked closely with
gacaca courts, also spoke to the culture of silence among those in
Rwanda. Because of the legal ramifications of talking publicly about
ethnic identity, he suggested there is still deep suspicion among
Hutu and Tutsi, but few speak of it. Contrary to Paul, who felt that
there is no palpable conflict among Hutu and Tutsi, Jean-Paul believed that this forced silence creates more animosity among ethnic
groups, creating a “tinderbox” of anger.
Joseph, in agreement with Paul’s perception, went into detail
regarding politics in Rwanda. For most of his adult life, Joseph
worked in governmental positions in Rwanda prior to his relocation to Canada. This included a high-ranking economic position
that resulted in his assignment to the Office of the President. He
suggested that the culture of silence created a distinct, yet inaccurate, portrait of Rwanda to the world:
I’ll tell you this. Everyone knows who stays in Rwanda. Sometimes we choose to stay silent. You may see the outer picture, but
it’s not the country that you actually see the way it is. The inside
of the country, what goes on in the leadership, is not what people
know about Rwanda. You may know some things. It does not
reflect reality.

Joseph elaborated by discussing the involvement of the government
in his occupation. He stated that there were times during his tenure
with the Office of the President that the administration wanted to
push a particular developmental goal:
It is going to be a problem for you if you disagree. You are going
to be told to say and write certain things. Then, that narrative is
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what goes out in the world. The truth is the country does have a
lot of things happening. People have gained a new sense of life. If
you want to have peace in Rwanda, make sure you don’t involve
yourself in politics. You don’t criticize the government, you do
whatever you are told to do and don’t question that or you are
going to have things happen to you.

Joseph has family remaining in Rwanda with whom he communicates frequently. He stated the fear that he has of the administration
did not dissipate when he left Rwanda, as there are ramifications
for those who remain if someone they know well (e.g., family member, close friend) speaks out against the government:
You cannot discuss politics at all. You can discuss family, how
you are doing, but you cannot mention politics. It has happened
to one of my sisters-in-law. We talked about political things and
then she mentioned to me that they can’t say anything and they
have to watch what they say. We ended our conversation and the
following day she was picked up and taken to the police. Our conversation had been tapped and she was asked to elaborate more
on everything she discussed with me. They took her to jail for one
month and three weeks.

For Joseph, the arrest and incarceration of his sister-in-law confirmed his suspicion that the culture of silence would be enforced
by the Rwandan government.
Marc’s narrative was similar to Joseph’s. He felt that his family members who remained in Rwanda were unable to speak with
him because of his vocal opposition to the Kagame administration.
For Marc’s family, there existed a belief that there would be consequences should they engage with him:
I had a sister here in Canada who would not even talk to me
because of the regime there. About three months ago I lost my
mother in Rwanda but they can’t talk to me and I can’t talk to
them—we can’t even talk. That’s how it is.

In this quote, Marc indicates that the culture of silence within
Rwanda has residual effects on those living in the diaspora. Indeed,
although both Marc and his sister reside in the diaspora, neither
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feel comfortable conversing with one another because of his history
of voicing dissent.
Monique, a participant who not only lived through the genocide but also witnessed the execution of her father and brothers,
relocated to the United States in 2001. Throughout her interview
she discussed the fear members of the diaspora—as well as those
in Rwanda—experienced when speaking to one another via telephone. She outlined her general belief about this issue, as well as
her own experience when calling her mother. She noted that it was
not simply concern regarding the monitoring of phone calls by authorities—she also feared informal surveillance by regular citizens
who might overhear a conversation:
I know that this happens. People are still cautious when talking
on the phone. There are people who can’t bring up anything and
that’s just a normal thing. Even if it’s not about criticizing the government, they are worried…they don’t want to discuss certain
things on the phone.
For instance, for my mom and my sister…I know there are things
that I can’t bring up or I just don’t talk about. I have never brought
up anything political. We know that we cannot talk on the phone
about these things. You don’t bring it up if you don’t want anyone
to hear because you don’t know what can be taken out of context.
You don’t want anything to be taken out of context.

Monique’s perception that the culture of silence will be enforced
is so strong that she has become wary of any speech that could be
“taken out of context.”
When asked his thoughts on why people were so afraid of the
Kagame regime and the RPF-led government, Jean-Paul explained:
They are afraid of the consequences or the repercussions of their
(gacaca) statements. They are afraid of the government. Everything is monitored from the top level of the government to the
lowest level of administration. Everything is monitored and people have to be silent.

The quote above echoes sentiments expressed by both Joseph and
Paul. While Jean-Paul is speaking specifically about gacaca, his
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supports the general theme that the administration may have silenced Rwandans, both during and after gacaca proceedings. JeanPaul also worked with researchers in attempts to understand the effectiveness of gacaca and how Rwandans felt about the process:
They are not free to speak about anything. I and other researchers
went to deep villages in Rwanda and ask people what they think
about gacaca. Everyone from Ruhengeri to Butare speak the same
language, “Gacaca is good, and everything is good! We thank the
president Kagame, we thank our leaders.” That was the same language. Very few people tell you, “Okay, if you want me to tell
you what I believe, you should grant me anonymity…” Very few
speak their mind, very few because of the regime in place and
because there is still suspicion.

The hesitancy among Rwandans to “speak their mind” extended to
civic engagement. Later in the interview, Jean-Paul explained that
during his time volunteering as a commissioner for the 2003 election, there was fear among citizens that their ballots were not confidential. According to Jean-Paul, voters worried about what might
happen to them if they did not vote for President Kagame. From a
phenomenological standpoint, it is not important whether or not
citizens’ votes were actually being tracked and monitored by the
RPF; the perception of some that this could happen was enough to
instill fear. Marie felt similarly.
Marie was 6 years old during the Rwandan genocide. Her father worked as a government official and was killed shortly after
the genocide began. She relocated with her family, first to Belgium
and then to the United States. Marie supported statements made by
other participants, suggesting that the Rwandan government has
created a culture of silence among Rwandans in an attempt to instill a sense of fear:
A lot of people silence themselves because we are afraid of the
consequence of what may happen. Once the government was able
to establish a sense of fear it makes you think that they are watching us even though they can’t watch everyone all the time. I was
reading a few months ago that, after the genocide it takes about
five generations to reconstruct a stable society, to reconcile with
what happened. We are starting the second generation in Rwanda
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and things are not getting better. We distrust each other. Even
among Hutus we don’t trust each other because of the silence culture. Among Hutus and Tutsis, it’s even worse.

Although Marie realizes that it is impossible for the Rwandan government to surveil all members of the diaspora at all times, the
fear is enough to create a culture of silence and sow distrust, even
among the diaspora.
Similar to Marie, Monique stated that she believed that people
were afraid to speak publicly about certain issues for fear of retribution by the government. On the other hand, she is different from
Marie in that she views the diaspora as being more “open” in terms
of expressing their dissent than those who remain in Rwanda:
I think that to some extent, people are afraid to talk. Normally
we don’t talk about things very much, about the things that may
put you into trouble. In Rwanda people have managed to find
a way to see that there are things you can’t talk about and just
leave it alone. We are opening up here (diaspora) more than we
are in Rwanda.. For survivors in Rwanda, they feel like the only
way to live peacefully is just to go along with what is going on
in the country, so just forget about the stuff. Because I’m here,
I’m not sure 100% if people disappear because of what they have
said and so forth. For survivors, I know there are some of them
that have been killed coming from gacaca courts and nobody has
followed up about these survivors getting killed and the disappearance. I know for some survivors after the gacaca court were
getting killed. But, unfortunately there are things that I hear but
I am not sure 100%.

Monique’s perception that the diaspora is willing to “[open] up
more” may be influenced by her skepticism regarding the veracity
of the stories she hears about what is going on in Rwanda.
The authoritarian nature of the Kagame administration is
known throughout academe, as are its implications on justice and
reconciliation in Rwanda (Clark, 2014; Hintjens, 2008; Ryentjens,
2011). Rwandans appear to tell two stories—one that has political
approval and state sponsorship, and one that they speak of while
looking over their shoulders. It is therefore difficult to make definitive claims regarding what is—or is not—occurring in Rwanda.
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However, participants’ statements, as outlined above, suggest that
what is occurring in Rwanda, whether real or imagined, impacts
the lives of diaspora members. Importantly, six out of eight participants spent the majority of their lives in Rwanda and had distinct
experiences regarding the political climate within the country. Because of the deep connection with their home country, including
previous residency, members of the diaspora are keenly aware of
what occurs in Rwanda and have very particular opinions and beliefs regarding these events (Marijnen, 2015).
Promoting Silence through Monitoring
As some of the quotes above indicate, the culture of silence appears to transcend the physical location of Rwanda and spills over
into the diaspora in the United States and Canada. For this reason,
even securing interviews for this research proved difficult. Members of the diaspora were afraid to speak, believing that their statements would become public knowledge and/or that the Rwandan
government would find out. These fears appeared to be partially
a result of the perceived level of monitoring among the diaspora,
which respondents felt could have very real consequences for them,
as well as for their family members remaining in Rwanda. When
discussing this with Paul, he stated:
I know it’s not easy (finding participants) because they don’t
know who the person is and they don’t know what the person is
going to do with their testimony. People are sort of scared of the
government so it is not easy to get many people to talk.

Marc was not surprised by the difficulty in securing participants
and stated, “It’s because they are afraid, so I’m actually surprised
you were able to find anybody (to talk with).” Marc believed that
even among the diaspora, Rwandans were afraid to speak publicly
about anything that might be considered negative against President
Kagame. Marc stated that there is a very real belief among the diaspora that what they say publicly might reach the ears of the Rwandan administration.
When discussing the fear among the diaspora of President Kagame, Joseph stated:
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The only reason I am trusting you right now is because I know that
you are handling this like a professional, but I have to be cautious
when discussing this with fellow Rwandans who I don’t trust. We
know how our government works; they have agents everywhere.

Joseph stated he believed the diaspora in Canada was actually monitored by the Rwandan government. He reported being approached
by the government to monitor the diaspora when he moved to Canada. Joseph was unwilling to do so, but many others were:
I have friends that are watched by police in hiding positions.
There are officers all around. For example, if you say something
about the government and the person whom you disclosed to
texts an intelligence officer, they take it back to the government. If
you happen to go back to Rwanda, this is how you may not come
back. They will arrest you and keep you there. (Because of this),
they (the diaspora) may not disclose anything about their government for fear of repercussions. It may come to bite them when
they go to Rwanda.

Marie also acknowledged the monitoring of the diaspora. When discussing the fear of monitoring among the diaspora, she shared a salient example from her personal experience as a diaspora member.
When Marie first arrived in the United States, she attempted
to participate in diaspora-based activities. She noticed that most
Rwandans in her area were Tutsi, and she tried to create activities
that encouraged Hutu to participate as well:
First, I got some emails…threatening emails from people who
worked at the embassy. I went to a conference and someone came
and he pretty much—he kind of pushed me around in front of everybody saying how I was promoting genocide ideology myself.
I was followed a couple times and I tried to put together a conference about the policy situation in Rwanda. I wanted to invite a
couple scholars on Rwanda. But among the scholars of Rwandan
government they are not approved. They are pretty much blacklisted. That also got me into trouble.
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She continued:
I had a class with someone who works at the embassy. At one
point we were supposed to present and he brought a couple people from the embassy with him. They kind of made me understand that I better not say anything that wasn’t appropriate for
our people.

Out of all eight participants, it appeared that Marc had the most
intense belief regarding the monitoring of the diaspora. This is
largely a result of his former occupational ties with the Rwandan
government, as well as his outspoken nature about political topics.
Marc was followed and monitored in South Africa, and he believes
that this action of the Rwandan government continued when he
relocated to Canada:
I first experienced that in South Africa. That is why I left, because
I could no longer sleep in my own house because of fear. So, of
course I’m aware of what happens. I cannot bear to sit at an event
with Rwandans I don’t know—they wouldn’t have me anyway
because I am an ’enemy of the state,’ as they call it.

Additionally, Marie’s family in Belgium were deeply afraid that she may
be hurt by those working for President Kagame in the United States.
They were most afraid that her research would make her a target:
It’s actually one of the main concerns I, and my family, had when
I was writing and talking about Rwandan politics. They were
saying, ‘Make sure we know where you are and where you are
going. Have someone, and a faculty member, with your emergency contact information.’ They were right, as I was getting phone
calls and letters when I was doing my research. I’m away from
Rwanda and I’m still young. I haven’t made any remarkable contributions but I still get threatening letters from people who were
trying to influence me.

Marie felt that these phone calls were a direct result of her vocal
opposition to the Kagame administration, which resulted from her
academic research on the Rwandan diaspora in Belgium. She did
not disclose the specific content of these phone calls or emails.
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When Monique discussed the possibility of diaspora members
being monitored, she agreed that it happens, but that it depends on
where someone is and what they speak about. While acknowledging the possibility of monitoring, she also said that she hoped that
this would change, as people needed to speak openly about their
feelings:
I think there are people who are followed, but it depends on where
you are. There are people who are very cautious. It depends on
who you are talking to, because there are times when you can say
things, but you don’t know who else is there. I know that happens
to some people. It has happened to people who have left Rwanda.
I used to worry about what I say. I don’t talk politics. I talk about
women’s issues. I care about those kinds of things. In the private
places or in conversation, you have to be able to open up about
certain things and tell people what you feel. Sometimes I feel like
it’s very scary. But sometimes it will be helpful for you to hear
perspective from different people and if it is taken in a good way
it can help. I hope that will change. We will see what happens.

Monique also discussed that this fear leads to Rwandans not being
interested in speaking with researchers. She informed me that it
was very rare for Rwandans to be willing to speak out about potentially political and divisive topics, and that no one would speak
without guaranteed confidentiality.
Joseph and Marc each discussed something very specific about
the monitoring of both those who remained in Rwanda and those
who relocated to Canada. There appears to be a very precise monitoring form utilized in Rwanda that may also be utilized in the
diaspora. Joseph elaborated on how this system appears:
Rwanda’s administration system, here is how monitoring works.
For example, every ten houses must have a RPF leader. One individual is in charge of those ten houses and communicates to the
government what is going on there. If the President is in the area
or something is happening, the leader must make sure that all the
ten people are there.
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Marc discussed this “10 house system” as well, but suggested that it
is not just applied in Rwanda, but is also utilized among the diaspora:
Do you know how the system works in Rwanda? The smallest unit
there is the one in charge of ten houses. It means that every village, every block, is organized as a unit of government so if anything happens in those ten houses it is reported. So you have the
smallest ten houses which are cells, then provinces, then districts,
and all of those are spy levels. It is how the government tracks
everyone’s house. It’s here (in the diaspora) too. Every grouping
has a mechanism of reporting. The next thing you know, if you
move to another house, the ambassador calls the ambassador in
Rwanda and then he tells Kagame.

Jean-Paul discussed the monitoring that occurs in Rwanda. However, he was less certain that this happens among the diaspora.
Interestingly, his narrative regarding monitoring also touches on
lack of reconciliation among the diaspora, precisely because diaspora-based organizations may be seen as instruments of the Kagame
administration:
I do not have any facts about that (monitoring in the diaspora). I
am aware though that few people participate in Rwandan diaspora associations here (the United States) and in Europe because
they mistrust those associations. Those who are believed to be
pro-RPF are the only ones that participate. This is why it’s rare
to see strong campaigns that bring together Rwandan diaspora
living here, in Canada, and in Europe. There is a big suspicion
and mistrust between Rwandans in the diaspora based primarily
on the past history of genocide and political support or opposition of the current government. The formal Rwandan diaspora
associations were established by the Rwandan embassies. Those
who are active in those associations often get involved as a way
of targeting political positions in the government or any other job.

Neither Pierre nor Therese talked about monitoring among the diaspora. This finding was not entirely surprising, as they appeared
to be the most supportive (or at least expressed neutrality) of President Kagame and the RPF government. With both participants, this
topic was broached, and both quickly replied that they did not want
to discuss this type of political topic.
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When asking respondents why they felt the Rwandan government worked so hard to create fear and silence among those in
Rwanda as well as the diaspora, the answers were varied. Some
suggested that it was a necessity to ensure that genocidal ideology
did not occur. Numerous participants suggested that it was done so
that President Kagame could maintain his stranglehold of political
power. Others suggested that the culture of fear was used to essentially create one approved post-genocidal narrative—a narrative
that paints all Hutu as perpetrators and all Tutsi as survivors.

Single Narrative
Legally, the elimination of ethnic categories has been utilized
as a form of social reconstruction following the genocide (Hintjens,
2008). Rwandans are no longer allowed to publicly identify as Hutu,
Tutsi, or Twa. This specific type of identification is considered divisive under Rwandan law, and penalties for such public identification can result in imprisonment. However, a new form of labelling
exists in Rwanda. Instead of identifying oneself by ethnicity, Rwandans now are classified as “perpetrator” or “survivor.”
However, it appears that it is a commonly held assumption
among both those in Rwanda and those in the diaspora that Hutu
are categorized as perpetrators/offenders and Tutsi are categorized
as survivors. This particular label appears to be a way to create a single, government-approved narrative about who did what during the
genocide. Five participants spoke specifically of a single narrative.
Marie was perhaps the most vocal about the single narrative created by the administration, likely because she identifies as an ethnic
Hutu. Moreover, her family died as a direct result of their moderate
political ideology and their refusal to commit genocidal acts:
The Hutus disappeared out of the genocide and it just became
Tutsi. You are like, what happened to all the moderate Hutu who
actually died saving Tutsi? They had family members who should
be recognized. Looking at my family, the oldest member of my
family is only 39 years old. He’s the oldest member and I’m like,
so what happened to the rest of them? What can’t I speak publicly that they were victims? That’s something I’ve been struggling with for so long, because the issue is saying that only the
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minority group were victims and everyone else wasn’t a victim.
They (politicians, President Kagame specifically) are sending a
message. They are not looking for justice and reconciliation; what
they are looking for is approval of their narrative itself. They are
not trying to bring people back together.

Joseph, a Tutsi, also suggested a single narrative exists in Rwanda.
It was audibly clear how angry it made him that only Tutsi were allowed to be survivors and Hutu perpetrators, particularly because
he had Tutsi family members that killed Hutu. He provided a particular example:
I am going to give you an example, my own brothers. I know that
my cousin’s brother went to the place where our grandfather and
my uncle’s wife and six kids were killed. They decided to kill every Hutu that was in that area as revenge. These were Hutu that
were killed and innocent people. I ask them sometimes why they
killed these people and they ask me why they killed our people.
There are so many incidents like that, so this single narrative is
just a joke.

Jean-Paul also discussed the inaccuracy of the single narrative, based
specifically on the number of those who died during the genocide.
When we talk about a million people killed in Rwanda, we didn’t
have a million Tutsi in Rwanda! That means the numbers that are
accumulating like that are also the bodies of Hutu. Some of us
have weaknesses and have hid bodies of the Hutus being killed
and buried in masses because the UN was going to come and
investigate the reported murder—the narrative makes it worse.

Marc outlined a single narrative that exists both in Rwanda and in
the diaspora and hinders reconciliation in both locations. He suggested that Hutu are essentially forced to ask for forgiveness, even
if they did not participate in the genocide:
Reconciliation has not happened because Kagame has divided
us—it’s confusing because on one hand they say ’we are Rwandans!’ On the other, he has told the Hutu to ask for forgiveness.
There is a program in Rwanda that asks Hutu to denounce what
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they did and ask for forgiveness which assumes all Hutu are perpetrators, even children—which is contradictory.

Paul outlined a single narrative, but did so in a somewhat indirect
manner. He spoke of his occupation and how as a Chief Judge he
was asked to render judgment on a variety of cases. Part of the reason that Paul left Rwanda was that he felt the government wanted
him to disperse judgment on one type of offender, Hutu. Paul spoke
frequently of the difficulty he had being an officer of the law and
not technically being permitted to hold certain Tutsi or RPF members accountable for their crimes. Furthermore, he suggested that
those with political and economic connections to the RPF were not
held accountable for their crimes. For Paul, this violated his moral
and ethical standards.
This narrative has been successfully incorporated into society,
as evidenced by respondents’ statements and current Rwandan
laws. Five respondents spoke of the single narrative that exists in
Rwanda, and suggested that this type of narrative hinders attempts
at justice and reconciliation among those in Rwanda. Again, it appears the single narrative that exists in Rwanda has a residual effect on the diaspora. All respondents reported first that justice and
reconciliation have not fully occurred in Rwanda, due to the imposition of a single narrative that transcends the borders of Rwanda.
The presence of this narrative created silence, and because of this
silence, Rwandans are not free to truly express their feelings regarding the genocide or discuss how it affected them.

Summary and Discussion
All eight participants discussed, in varying levels of detail, current Rwandan politics and more specifically, the culture of silence
they create. Seven out of eight participants spoke of personal experiences they, or their family members, had that supported such
claims. All eight participants stated that President Kagame and the
RPF-led administration governed Rwanda in an authoritarian fashion, which severely limited freedom of speech. This belief that the
Rwandan government has a stranglehold on freedom of speech,
and passes laws with severe consequences for ambiguous “divisive” speech and action, is supported by both academic literature
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and non-governmental publications (Amnesty International, 2010;
Beswick, 2010; Vandeginste, 2014). Participants, however, varied in
their beliefs regarding the appropriateness of such actions.
Respondents had conflicted opinions of President Kagame. While
acknowledging the positive economic and infrastructure changes
the Kagame administration has achieved, participants were also well
versed in the authoritarian nature of his administration. Six participants outlined very strong feelings about the Rwandan government
and its control and believed that this severely hindered attempts at
justice and reconciliation for those in Rwanda. For these participants,
the lack of honest public discourse combined with a fear of the government made issues associated with ethnicity worse and created a
culture where Rwandans, both in country and in the diaspora, were
afraid to speak publicly about a variety of topics.
The culture of silence appears to have a residual effect on the
diaspora, most notably through the perception that it is monitored
by Rwandan government officials, or by Rwandans who will report back. Participants suggest that this culture creates a sense of
silence and fear among them, understanding that public statements
may have consequences for them and for their families remaining
in Rwanda.
Regarding participants’ belief that their movements in the diaspora were being monitored by the RPF, Reyntjens (2011) and
Hintjens (2008) suggest that if monitoring does exist, it is probably
directed at those members of the diaspora who are considered political, divisive, or dissenters. Reyntjens (2011) argued that some are
more likely to be monitored than others, particularly those who are
considered dangerous, usually by participation in political activism, previous governmental work in Rwanda, or level of intimacy
(inside knowledge) with the Rwandan government. Based on previous employment and current activities, it is likely that five participants would be considered dissenters.
Because the topic of “monitoring” was unexpected, the first author spent considerable time discussing with participants why they
felt it happened. More specifically, the first author explored why they
felt President Kagame ruled so authoritatively and how this control
extended to the diaspora. Responses varied, with no real consensus
among participants. However, one general theme appeared that was
not anticipated—the single narrative. Five participants spoke of this,
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indicating that they believed the push to impart and reinforce this narrative was a large driver of the tactics of the Rwandan government.
It is known that many Hutu died during the genocide as a result
of their moderate political stance and for their attempts to rescue
and protect Tutsi. However, the five participants made clear that
this was in violation with the national narrative that President Kagame has created around the genocide. While the Rwandan government now professes that ethnicity and ethnic differences do not
exist, with public ethnic identification being illegal, a new labelling
system has replaced it. This system indicates quite clearly that only
Tutsi may be considered as survivors of the genocide and Hutu are
named as perpetrators. To be clear, by highlighting participants’
perceptions that the RPF does not allow for a multiplicity of experiences concerning the 1994 genocide we are not suggesting a “double
genocide” took place in Rwanda—one against the Tutsi minority
in 1994 and a second against the Hutus. Indeed, such claims have
been made and have been found to lack empirical support (Strauss,
2019). Similar to Strauss—and in line with the perceptions of our
participants—we endeavor to draw attention to the limitations of
reductionist and binary thinking about the violence in Rwanda.
Political silence exists in Rwanda, and to a lesser extent among
the diaspora. There is a layer of “opaqueness” that exists, which impedes our understanding of the situation. While speech in the diaspora is stifled, it appears that more honest conversations can exist
there than in Rwanda. Thus, understanding the diaspora may help
us more clearly understand what may be occurring in Rwanda.
Future research on diaspora populations should consider the
cyclical nature of the relationship between the home country and
the diaspora. It is important to acknowledge not only how political
issues occurring in home countries affect their diaspora populations, but how diaspora populations can also influence and affect
home countries. Participants suggested that there is an underlying political narrative which exists among the diaspora. It may be
that, as suggested by participants, there are also issues of divisiveness within ethnicities as they begin to take “pro-Kagame” and
“anti-government” stances. Future research may address this issue
more specifically, focusing on political beliefs of participants. These
beliefs may work as an additional source of contention among the
diaspora or may possibly serve in the process of unification.
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Methodological Issues/Limitations of Research
Because of methodological issues inherent in the research design, findings from this study should not be used to draw conclusions about genocide survivors or diaspora members outside of this
sample. While snowball sampling was an appropriate way in which
to conduct a study of this nature, it was clearly not without its issues. Snowball sampling is susceptible to selection bias, as initial
gatekeepers and all participants may have entirely different experiences and notions of ethnic division and potential divisiveness
compared to those who were not part of this research. Indeed, all
participants were well-educated men and women, and four of them
worked within the judiciary or in high level positions within the
government. These positions and identities ultimately impact their
experiences during the 1994 genocide and, thus, their perception
of events. Put simply, it is likely the experiences and perceptions of
well-educated, highly-skilled Rwandans in the diaspora are very
different from those who do not have the same educational or vocational backgrounds. It should be noted, however, that the majority
of the participants shared similar beliefs regarding the genocide
and current political climate in Rwanda, regardless of their age,
ethnicity, or gender. Many Rwandans who are members of the diaspora may have similar qualifications, as these qualifications make it
easier to immigrate.
Moreover, participants who agreed to participate in this study
may be inherently different than those who elected not to, or those
we were unable to reach. Members of the diaspora who were willing to share their stories might have completely different life-stories
and ideas about justice and reconciliation than those who did not
participate. We also attempted (via contact with participants and
lengthy internet searches) to identify members of the alleged “extremist” diaspora. We were unable to locate any members of such
diaspora groups that wished to participate in this research. Future
research should attempt to document the experiences of these individuals and examine their perception of the political climate in
post-genocide Rwanda. Researchers should also consider exploring
whether or not the lived experiences of Rwandan diaspora members are similar to those of other populations who have been displaced by violence, such as political refugees and asylum seekers,
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in general. Such an investigation would provide meaningful insight on the extent to which political dissent, the notion of a single
narrative, and fear of surveillance are common among populations
of people displaced by violence.
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